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Abstract: As a conceptual resource for rhetoric, contemporary 
neuroscience has considerable potential. Yet how exactly 
rhetoricians should deploy it as such requires careful consideration. 
While some engage neuroscience in a foundationalist fashion, using 
it to ground rhetoric in empirically tested claims, I make the case 
for a non-foundationalist approach, arguing that neuroscience can 
serve as a resource for rhetoric on the basis of epistemologies that 
value the speculative, indeterminate, and contingent. That is, we 
can use neuroscience to achieve perspective rather than proof and 
continued conversation rather than resolution. More specifically, I 
suggest placing neuroscience in incongruous contact with rhetoric, 
using it to achieve Burkean perspective by incongruity. I then do so 
in an extended example that puts Antonio Damasio’s somatic 
marker hypothesis in incongruous contact with ancient accounts of 
eikos, thereby offering a fresh angle from which to view enduring 
discussions anew.  
Keywords: neurorhetorics, epistemology, Kenneth Burke, 
perspective by incongruity, somatic marker hypothesis, eikos 
By now, to say that neuroscientific research has proliferated in 
recent years and that the media has responded by devoting 
considerable attention to its findings is to utter a truism. 
Reports of neuroscientific findings regularly appear in 
newspapers, magazines, and television programs and circulate 
via blogs and across social media platforms. The reason for its 
popularity, it would appear, lies in part in neuroscience’s ability 
to tell us about so much more than brain function. In providing 
insight into the cognitive apparatus, neuroscience would seem 
to have implications for many, if not all, spheres of human 
affairs; indeed as an explanatory resource, it has been said to 
have a seductive allure (Weisberg et al., 2008). In the academy, 
this has led to the emergence of various neuro-subfields, such as 
neuroeconomics, neurolaw, neuroaesthetics, neuroethics, and 
so forth, each of which uses neuroscience as a resource with 
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which to develop accounts of disciplinary matters. Some 
scholars suggest that the pervasiveness of neuroscientific 
accounts has resulted in a now-dominant neuroculture, 
characterized by the belief in the brain as the originary site of all 
human activity (Ortega and Vidal, 2011). 
It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that contemporary 
neuroscience would find its way to rhetoric, not only as a site for 
analysis (eg. Condit, 1996; Gibbons, 2007; Graham, 2009; 
Johnson, 2008), but also as a conceptual resource (eg. Davis, 
2008; Fahnestock, 2005; Lunceford, 2007; Pruchnic, 2008). 
Even in 1990, it was already possible for Jeffrey Walker to 
observe that, “Periodically in recent years, neurological research 
has been invoked as an emerging and important source of 
knowledge for the rhetorician” (Walker, 1990, 301; for example, 
see Gregg, 1984). Of course, using neuroscience to gain insight 
into rhetorical processes is not to do something unprecedented. 
Rhetoricians have long drawn upon psychological theories. 
However, compared to the rest of the cognitive sciences, 
contemporary neuroscience tends to be more determinedly 
focused on the biological systems that underlie cognition and 
more technologically complex, often employing neuroimaging 
scans, single neuron studies, and electroencephalographic 
recordings, to name just a few examples. Any attempt, then, to 
bring neuroscience’s high-tech and complex brain research into 
rhetorical purview throws matters of disciplinarity into sharp 
relief. 
Scholars across the academy have explored neuroscience’s 
relationships to their respective disciplines (Stafford, 2011; 
Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). Rhetoricians, for their part, have 
grappled with the specific questions that arise when bringing 
neuroscience to rhetoric (Jack and Applebaum, 2010; Mays and 
Jung, 2012; Gruber et al., 2011). Jordynn Jack and Gregory 
Applebaum usefully termed the entire endeavor 
“neurorhetorics,” identifying the rhetorical analysis of 
neuroscientific discourses as “the rhetoric of neuroscience” 
while referring to the use of neuroscience research to derive 
insights into rhetorical processes “the neuroscience of rhetoric.” 
This paper is exclusively concerned with the latter, not because 
the approaches are not interconnected in important ways, but 
because they ultimately involve distinct attendant concerns. As 
site for analysis, neuroscience raises the type of concerns that 
rhetoricians of science must address when they analyze any set 
of scientific practices and/or artifacts. As a conceptual resource, 
on the other hand, neuroscience raises epistemological 
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questions about the nature of rhetorical theory itself. In this 
paper, I argue for a style of neurorhetorical engagement 
decisively aligned with rhetoric’s non-foundational tradition, an 
approach invested in enriching perspective rather than 
universal truth and continued conversation rather than 
resolution. Specifically, I make the case for a Burkean-inspired 
neurorhetorics that employs perspective by incongruity toward 
the ends of insight. After a brief overview of rhetoric’s 
epistemological tradition and neurorhetorics thus far, I explain 
how we might engage with neuroscience in this way, ending 
with an extended example that uses neuroscience to achieve 
Burkean perspective by incongruity on ancient discussions of 
eikos. 
Rhetorical Epistomologies and Neurorhetorics 
Thus Far 
From its inception, both foundationalist and non-
foundationalist epistemological impulses have motivated the 
rhetorical field. As the prevailing epistemological bent in the 
Western intellectual tradition, foundationalist epistemologies 
that posit knowledge as universally valid and objective 
information about the world as it really is have variously guided 
the field, troubled it, and served as its productive foil. Plato’s 
critique of rhetoric as a lowly art arose out of his foundationalist 
philosophy. In the twentieth century, advocates of a positivistic 
rhetoric have, at times, attempted to push the field toward 
empirical verification as ultimate goal and/or toward adopting 
scientific or social scientific methodologies (Becker, 1969; 
Bowers, 1999; Simons, 1978). In a 1968 work, John Waite 
Bowers described rhetoric’s proper role as pre-scientific 
suggesting that, “the rhetorical critic’s principal task is to 
produce testable hypotheses which, when verified, will have the 
status of scientific laws” (Bowers, 1968, 127). But perhaps most 
often, the influence is even more indirect than even that. 
William Nothstine, Carole Blair, and Gary Copeland made the 
case that in the latter half of the twentieth century, scientific 
ideals subtly infiltrated the discipline, and that one can find 
evidence of them in the discipline-wide emphasis on rhetoric’s 
explanatory function as well as its concern for generalizability, 
objectivity, testability, and progress (Nothstine et al., 1994, 36; 
see also Brummett, 1984, 97-98; Farrell, 1980, 300, Zarefsky, 
2008, 637).  
But forays into foundationalism notwithstanding, rhetoric 
has also resisted dominant foundationalist ideologies. A robust 
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and enduring non-foundationalist impulse characterizes the 
field. For one, scholars in rhetoric have done a good deal to 
disclose science’s rhetorical dimensions (Lyne and Howe, 1986; 
Gross, 1996; Taylor, 1996). Moreover, within the discipline, a 
positivistic approach to rhetoric is not particularly influential 
and many rhetorical scholars are skeptical of any call to make 
rhetoric like the social sciences (see Lyne, 1985, 73; Bowers, 
1999, 46; Farrell, 1980, 300; Gehrke, 2009, 71-72; Nothstine et 
al., 1994, 50-51). Perhaps more importantly, rhetoric’s 
assertions of non-foundationalism are constructive 
articulations, valuations of ways of engaging with the world that 
strive for something other than absolute certainty.1 The 
Sophists, of course, embraced opinion and appearance as vital 
forms of knowing (Consigny, 1996). Discussions of rhetoric as 
technic, epistemic, aesthetic, pragmatic and/or hermeneutic 
articulate non-foundational conceptions of rhetoric that 
emphasize doing, being, and understanding, among other things 
(see Atwill, 2009; Scott, 1967; Carleton, 1985; Cherwitz and 
Hikins, 1983; Poulakos, 1983, Whitson and Poulakos, 1993; 
Farrell, 1976; Hyde and Smith, 1979; Schräg, 1985; Danisch, 
2007; Horne, 1989).  
Moreover, much rhetorical scholarship proceeds by a largely 
informal and implicit nonfoundationalism, with practitioners 
assuming what some have described as the role of “the critic-
artist.” While the “critic-scientist” aims to control variables, 
operationalize terms, and so forth, the critic-artist is 
“functioning artistically: immersing himself in the particulars of 
his object of study, searching for the distinctive, illumining with 
metaphor the rhetorical transaction” (Sloan et al., 1971, 223). 
Barry Brummett similarly regards rhetorical theories not as 
objective or predictive statements about the world but as “a 
form, pattern, or recipe, a statement in the abstract” that 
“teach[es] people how to experience their rhetorical 
                                                  
1 In this context, the term “epistemology” may be somewhat 
contentious. The term has close ties to objectivist and positivistic 
models of knowledge, and many who want it loosed from those ties 
distance themselves from it (Whitson and Poulakos, 1993; Rorty, 
1979), though not all do (Hyde and Smith, 1979; Carleton, 1985). Yet, 
though it is loaded term, it is nonetheless an expedient one for 
collectively identifying theorizations of how we come to know the 
world. So while I use the term “epistemology,” I do so ecumenically, 
including within its purview forms of understanding, appreciating, 
enriching, and even complicating that do not strive toward 
foundations of certainty and would not fit within a certain traditional 
epistemological model. 
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environments more richly” (Brummett, 1984, 103). 
Consequently, as Brummett has pithily remarked, instead of 
being held to standards of falsifiability, “rhetorical theories are 
like vampires: you need to see one in action only once to believe 
in what it can do, and it is nearly impossible to kill” (Brummett, 
1984, 99; see also Black, 1980, 333). In doing so, rhetorical 
theories generate conversation – including the conversations of 
rhetorical criticism, providing prompts, provocations, turning 
points, and tangents, giving us something to talk about and 
keeping the discussion going (Burke, 1973, 110- 111). In a 
hermeneutic sense, this conversation is sense-making; through 
it, we arrive at insights and understandings. As Richard Rorty 
describes it, “This hope is not a hope for the discovery of 
antecedently existing common ground, but simply hope for 
agreement, or, at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement,” and 
ultimately of “finding a new and more interesting way of 
expressing ourselves, and thus of coping with the world” (Rorty, 
1979, 318, 359). This conversation can include, jostling against 
each other, the poetic, the satirical, and the parodic, together 
with the rational and scientific.  
A key question for conceptual neurorhetorics, then, is how to 
bring rhetoric into conversation with a discipline so decisively 
foundationalist as neuroscience. Perhaps the most 
straightforward approach is to hew to the foundationalist line to 
some degree or another. One brings neuroscience to bear in an 
authorizing fashion, using it to ground rhetoric, make it more 
real, give it a basis, or shatter something already believed about 
it (Fahnestock, 2005, 175, 174; Lunceford, 2007, 91; Davis, 
2008,131).2 Scientizing rhetoric in this way forefronts 
foundationalist commitments, making the empirical strength of 
neuroscientific claims the bedrock on which we accept or reject 
rhetorical claims. Thus alongside such work come appeals for 
caution, for greater understanding and scrutiny of the 
neuroscientific work one brings to rhetoric, calls for rhetoricians 
to hold themselves responsible for not only understanding the 
neuroscientific claim, but also the processes by which it is 
established and/or bids for increasing collaboration between 
rhetoricians and neuroscientists, thus promoting rigor and 
guarding against the careless use of science (Rose, 1988; 
                                                  
2 Granted these are relatively minor moves in longer, more 
nuanced work. Jeanne Fahnestock, for example, is clear that 
rhetoricians should not model themselves on cognitive neuroscientists 
and Diane Davis uses hedging phrases, such as “can be read as” and 
“purportedly” (Fahnestock, 2005, 175; Davis, 2008, 131). 
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Brueggemann, 1989; Jack and Appelbaum, 2010; Mays and 
Jung, 2012, 47; Gruber et al., 2011). 
A non-foundationalist impulse certainly underlies some such 
arguments for caution, particularly those that draw attention to 
neuroscience’s rhetoricity, highlighting its indeterminacy and 
epistemological uncertainty, thereby critically unpacking it 
(Mays and Jung, 2012; Jack, 2010). This paper’s non-
foundationalism, however, is less analytical and more 
inventional (Gruber, 2016). It considers what we can do with 
neuroscience, how we can use it productively, as perspective, 
particularly by putting it in speculative, contingent, and 
indeterminate conversation with rhetoric. 
A Neurorhetoric of Incongruous Perspective  
Interdisciplinary engagements often aim toward integration, 
seeking the synthesis of disciplinary claims and theories in some 
form or another (Klein, 1990). But, disciplines can engage 
aiming for other than synthesis and integration, as in a 
neurorhetoric of incongruity. This strategy is inspired by 
Kenneth Burke’s “perspective by incongruity,” a critical method 
in which one defies conventional pieties about what goes with 
what, forcing a juxtaposition of the discomfitingly incongruous. 
Burke emphasizes terminological incongruities; as he explains, 
one employs perspective by incongruity when one takes “a word 
[that] belongs by custom to a certain category” and then 
purposefully “wrench[es] it loose and metaphorically appl[ies] it 
to a different category,” engaging in what he also calls “verbal 
‘atom cracking’” (Burke, 1984a, 308). But the approach is 
applicable beyond the semantic level and one might also bring 
about the atom-cracking collision of ideas, ideologies, or images 
(Rosteck and Leff, 1989, 331; Demo, 2000, 134). The approach 
to neurorhetorics I recommend is conceptual, entailing the 
planned incongruous collision of rhetorical and neuroscientific 
claims. 
Perspective by incongruity is simultaneously disruptive and 
productive. The collision of perspectives it brings about often 
prompts the reexamination of taken-for-granted beliefs. One 
can compare it to consciousness-raising in that it “de-
naturalizes a given set of meanings or values and questions their 
adequacy for explaining or directing experience” (Dow, 1994, 
229). But it does so while also inviting the constructive acts of 
“comparison, re-classification, and renaming” that can 
“supplant a traditional view of a situation with a new and 
restructured one” (Dow, 1994, 229; Foss, 1979, 11). That is, in 
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unsettling established modes of thought, it can enable new ones 
to emerge, thereby serving as a catalyst for change. As a result, it 
is often strategically employed by those engaged in advocacy, 
who seek redefinition, reclassification and renaming of 
established orders (Dow, 1994, 229; Demo, 2000). But 
perspective by incongruity need not be employed toward 
overturning an existing order, and its reexaminations and 
reorientations can yield a better understanding of it as well.  
As James Jasinski observes, rhetorical scholars have largely 
employed perspective by incongruity in one of two ways, (1) as a 
critical heuristic; analyzing a text from an unexpected or 
atypical perspective (Jasinski, 2001, 434; see Stelzner, 1971; 
Gregg and Hauser, 1973) or (2) as a rhetorical strategy one 
discerns in texts under analysis (Jasinski, 2001, 434; see Demo, 
2000; Dow, 1994). While either is viable for neurorhetoric 
(particularly the former), this paper takes a third tack, using 
perspective by incongruity as a resource for theoretical 
reflection.3 Incongruously placing neuroscientific claims 
alongside ancient rhetorical theories enables unexpected and 
potentially enlightening conjunctions and disjunctions to 
emerge. In doing so, this paper aims neither for integration nor 
resolution, but for an enriched perspective on rhetorical theory 
and history, with potentially new directions for discussion. 
Importantly, in a neurorhetoric of incongruity, we can 
bracket the sorts of empirical and methodological debates in the 
neurosciences that often become the fraught focal point of other 
neurorhetorical engagements. Because a neurorhetoric of 
incongruity is inventional rather than justificatory, it avoids 
harnessing rhetorical claims to the empirical success or failure 
of neuroscientific ones. We can mindfully put these debates 
aside. There is a certain deviance in doing so, to be sure, yet one 
thoroughly in line with Burke’s strategies of incongruity, 
whereby one might also “writ[e] a history of medicine by a 
careful study of the quacks” or “deliberately [discard] available 
data in the interests of a fresh point of view” (Burke, 1984b, 120- 
121). Moreover, engaging with neuroscience in this manner does 
not eliminate accountability. As John Lyne has written, “Any 
speech act should be accountable to the world in which it is 
introduced” and a neurorhetoric of incongruity is subject to 
various non-foundational accountabilities (Lyne, 1985, 70). 
Rhetoric itself is one such type; arguments establish robustness 
                                                  
3 This is not unrelated to the approach Debra Hawhee elaborates 
in “Historiography by Incongruity” (Hawhee, 2013). 
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and reveal weakness (Lyne, 1985, 70). Consensus is another, 
and in the field “the ‘validity’ of knowledge and truth clearly 
hinges on the presence or absence of a rhetorically created 
consensus among a community of significant others” (Bineham, 
1990, 53; see also Carleton, 1985; Farrell, 1976; Brummett, 
1976). In a neurorhetoric of incongruity, perspectives are 
evaluated in the course of scholarly argument and by their 
reception within the academic community; do others accept 
them or reject them, propagate them or leave them to shrivel 
unattended (i.e. unpublished or uncited).  
To illustrate the approach in greater detail, I provide an 
extended example of how one might use neuroscience in this 
fashion.  
Neuroscience as Incongruous Perspective on the 
Rhetorical Probable 
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
One area of neuroscientific inquiry with potential to enrich 
and enlighten rhetorical matters is embodied cognition. Already 
a highly interdisciplinary research field, it includes 
contributions by philosophers, artificial intelligence researchers, 
and linguists, among others (Edelman, 1989; Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Gallagher, 2006). A particularly 
promising strain of that work, sometimes called “affective 
neuroscience,” addresses the neurological underpinnings of 
emotion, extending an even longer line of research on the 
embodiment of emotion (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; see 
also, James, 1894). I focus on one small slice of that work here, 
the somatic marker hypothesis, placing it alongside ancient 
views on eikos, or that which is/seems likely to be the case.4 
Given that this example serves as a relatively brief illustration 
within a much broader discussion, my account will be 
necessarily somewhat cursory and its returns modest. Rather 
than a comprehensive study, I simply hope to demonstrate 
something of the potential of an atom-cracking neurorhetoric of 
incongruity. 
                                                  
4 Although it is often translated as “the probable,” that rendering 
is problematic given that “eikos” does not refer to probability in the 
mathematical sense; “likelihood” is a more faithful translation (See 
Hoffman, 2008, 4; Walton, 2001, 94). For a detailed semantic history 
of the term “eikos,” see Hoffman (Hoffman, 2008). 
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The somatic marker hypothesis theorizes emotion’s place in 
decision-making processes. Both controversial and influential, it 
is most closely associated with Antonio Damasio, who has 
written of it in both major science journals and in 
popularizations, including the widely read Descartes’ Error. By 
my distillation, which draws from Damasio’s work, the somatic 
marker hypothesis posits the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as 
the neurological seat of a system by which emotion influences 
decision-making. During the process of decision-making, a 
person’s body undergoes an emotional response, which 
constitutes a crude set of biasing signals that mark various 
options as favorable or unfavorable. This response is largely 
determined by prior experience and is followed by conscious 
reasoning and reflection, which can ultimately override it. As a 
crude preliminary biasing step, the somatic marker system 
serves a broad and pervasive function in decision-making and is 
essential to behaving advantageously in the complex and 
uncertain social situations that abound in everyday life. Notably, 
people with brain damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
tend to make poor social decisions, despite the fact that their 
intelligence generally remains intact (see Damasio, 1994; 
Damasio, 1996; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 
1994; Bechara et al., 1997). 
Any account of the somatic marker hypothesis is 
complicated by the existence of a veritable morass of associated 
literature. Today, scholarship on the subject includes legions of 
studies, which offer support for the theory, call it into question, 
or consider its implications. Many focus on the paradigmatic 
experiment that provides the key psychophysiological support 
for the hypothesis, reinterpreting the original results, applying it 
to different clinical groups, or employing it in somewhat altered 
form, for example. Some research addresses the proposed 
neural substrate, including lesion, brain imaging, and 
pharmacological studies, while still other work tackles the 
hypothesis’s theoretical presuppositions (for reviews of the 
literature, see Dunn et. al., 2006; Linquist and Bartol, 2013; 
Reimann and Bechara, 2010). The approach I recommend cuts 
through the mire: one consciously (and conscientiously) 
brackets much neuroscientific wrangling while distilling a 
version of the hypothesis, which one asserts as a rhetorically 
useful perspective. 
In a neurorhetoric of incongruity, one can draw on empirical 
studies as illustrative, such as the one Damasio and his 
colleagues developed to assess decision-making. The 
Michelle Gibbons 10 Poroi 13,2 (January 2018) 
experiment, known as the Iowa Gambling Task, provides an 
excellent illustration of the somatic marker hypothesis. It 
consists of a card game designed to mirror the uncertainty of 
social situations, one in which participants accrue money while 
choosing from decks of cards, which come with variable rewards 
and penalties discovered only through the course of the 
experiment. In Damasio’s research, subjects with damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex displayed compelling differences 
in performance compared to neurotypicals. Early in the game, 
brain-intact participants began to avoid decks in which 
penalties were greater than rewards, and to exhibit autonomic 
arousal (as measured by skin conductance) when selecting from 
“bad” decks, as if in anticipation of punishment. However, when 
asked about the game, at first participants had no idea what was 
happening and had developed no strategy. Over time, the 
majority of neurotypicals eventually formed a conscious and 
explicit idea of why certain decks were better or worse than 
others. Meanwhile, brain-damaged participants did not tend to 
avoid the “bad” decks and did not exhibit autonomic arousal 
when choosing from them early in the game. Most remarkably, 
even the three impaired participants who could eventually 
explain which decks were better still did not make the most 
advantageous choices (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 1996). 
Researchers ultimately proposed that neurotypical 
participants engaged two distinct but parallel and interacting 
systems while playing the game. One is the level of the somatic 
marker, the non-declarative dispositional knowledge related to 
an individual’s emotional experience of a given situation, which 
developed throughout the game. The other is the level of overt 
reasoning, in which participants consciously reasoned about the 
process. So, the researchers explained, the somatic marker 
guides behavior before conscious knowledge does, enabling 
neurotypical participants to choose advantageously before even 
realizing why or how they did so (Bechara et al., 1997). In other 
words, somatic marker hypothesis research suggests that 
contrary to popular opinion, we are not at our decision-making 
best in the absence of emotion, and emotion-mediated hunches 
about what is likely to happen are invaluable. 
The Somatic Marker as Perspective 
The somatic marker hypothesis might conceivably provide 
insight into many different rhetorical matters, including 
phronesis, embodiment and bodily rhetorics, and rhetoric’s 
relationship with emotion (see Oakley, 1999; Gross, 2006). Out 
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of many possibilities, I put the somatic marker hypothesis in 
conversation with rhetorical perspectives on likelihood, in part 
because of the incongruousness of putting a neuroscientific 
theory that points to the wet stuff of individual neural 
architecture in conversation with the speculations of ancient 
Greek rhetoricians. Moreover, eikos is in some ways a less 
obvious choice than other possibilities, enhancing the sense of 
impropriety. By compelling us to pay attention to the 
conjunctions and disjunctions that emerge, juxtaposing the 
ancients’ views on eikos with the somatic marker hypothesis 
immerses us “in the particulars of [the] object of study,” thereby 
constituting the act of the critic-artist (Sloan et al., 1971, 223). 
In turning a novel lens to the particulars of the ancients’ 
positions, it also has the potential to discover delightful and 
controversial surprises, which may disrupt some established 
lines of thinking, or at least provide productive reorientations 
and reexaminations of them. 
In this paper, somatic markers enable incongruous 
reorientations to and reexaminations of ancient deliberations 
regarding rhetoric’s proper subject matter, offering new 
perspectives on some well-trodden discussions. Ancient 
discussions of rhetoric’s subject often addressed eikos, or what 
Aristotle defined as “that which generally happens, not however 
unreservedly, as some define it, but that which is concerned 
with things that may be other than they are,” in contrast to the 
true, the necessary, and the unchanging (Rhetoric, I.2.1357a15-
b16, trans. Freese). The debates were both normative and 
evaluative, tackling the extent to which rhetoric should traffic in 
likelihood and how we then should value rhetorical pursuits as a 
result. 
In rhetoric, the term “eikos” generally refers to a person’s 
understanding of that which is likely to happen in a given 
situation (Walton, 2001, 104). Somatic markers, on the other 
hand, are physiologically recorded measures of likelihood. 
Somatic markers keep track of the pairing of bodily state and 
situation, “[reflecting] access to records of previous individual 
experience . . . records shaped by reward, punishment, and the 
emotional state that attends them” (Bechara et al., 1997, 1294). 
As such, I might describe the somatic marker system’s biases as 
likelihood management vehicles in the form of bodily 
dispositions. For example, when neurologically intact card game 
participants begin to get negative outcomes from bad decks, 
they seemingly respond to the likelihood that that if they were 
bad before they will be bad again. And the body seemingly 
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initiates a response based on likelihood before declarative 
knowledge ever comes to the fore. Therefore, while arguments 
from eikos work within the system of conscious reasoning, the 
somatic marker system can be described as managing likelihood 
in a covert and bodily manner.5 
So in what light do somatic markers cast Plato, who 
advocated the true and necessary as the most valuable forms of 
knowledge? Plato sharply distinguished between eikos, which 
concerns the level of contingent physical reality, and true 
knowledge, which is abstract, universally valid, and has to do 
with the realm of the eternal and universal forms. Eikos is a 
region of relative stability among the flux of contingent reality, 
but it is a tenuous stability, subject to both change and 
exception. He considered the level of contingent reality inferior 
to the level of true knowledge. He furthermore asserted that 
though it does not require the use of eikos, with its mere 
likeness of the truth, good speech requires true knowledge 
(Plato, Phaedrus, 259e-260e, trans. Nicols). As William 
Grimaldi observes, “While it is impossible to escape the fact that 
Plato admits the legitimacy of an art of language … the burden 
of his argument would appear to restrict its legitimate exercise 
to the object of the speculative intellect: the knowledge of 
ultimate, unchanging reality. There can be no art of rhetoric 
without episteme” (Grimaldi, 1972, 22). Plato embraces rational 
investigation that aims to discover the true and unchanging, not 
discourse that settles for the likely. 
One might begin incongruously pairing Plato’s views on 
eikos with the somatic marker hypothesis by considering how 
the former align with the latter. Perhaps surprisingly, Damasio’s 
theory does not stand in contradiction to Plato’s views on 
likelihood. For one, Plato conceded that in the absence of 
knowledge, people can nonetheless arrive at the correct course 
of action (Meno, 97a-d, trans. Grube). Moreover, despite the 
vast scope of embodied likelihoods, the somatic marker 
hypothesis clearly leaves room for reasoned reflection as a 
distinct system of knowledge. Those patients who had suffered 
ventromedial damage still retained the type of knowledge that 
enabled them to score well on intelligence tests. They may not 
have been able to make advantageous life decisions, but they 
                                                  
5 Because the somatic marker hypothesis has to do with 
likelihoods as experienced rather than necessarily understood or 
known, I do not use the term eikos to identify bodily likelihoods, 
though one could make a case for why eikos should encompass both. 
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could certainly solve equations. Plato might well have seen no 
challenge to his philosophical system in Damasio’s somatic 
marker hypothesis. Just as Plato dismissed arguments from 
eikos, he very well would have dismissed embodied likelihoods 
as unrelated to true and certain knowledge and the universal 
forms. Plato might agree that the space for true knowledge in 
the world’s affairs is slight, yet he would still think it worthwhile 
to try to discover it. 
Yet the perspective by incongruity generated here is also 
productively disruptive. For one, it highlights the tension 
between focusing tenaciously on eternal truths while embodied 
likelihoods presumably course through the body in a largely 
covert and inescapable fashion. Moreover, it would seem that 
eliminating eikos-based argument might not eliminate 
likelihood’s influence. Even a Platonic search for eternal truth 
would not be immune to this fundamental dimension of human 
response. Likelihoods might be much harder to banish from 
discourse than Plato might have liked and examining the 
implications of that could be quite fruitful. What does it mean if 
the search for eternal truth is nonetheless inextricably 
intertwined with embodied likelihood at every step? 
In addition, there is also room for a more playful form of 
perspective by incongruity, similar to the strategies of 
incongruity Anne Demo describes in her work on the feminist 
art activists, the Guerrilla Girls, who would, for example, put a 
guerilla mask on a female body to disrupt conventional 
expectations of the female form. In that spirit, we might take 
Plato’s vision of the philosopher who abandons likelihoods in 
the pursuit of true knowledge as an endorsement of the sort of 
brain damage that is the subject of Damasio’s work. The person 
who can most fully operate outside of the purview of likelihood 
is the individual whose ventromedial prefrontal cortex has been 
damaged, and who thereby no longer has a functional somatic 
marker system. The ideal philosopher, then, is the one whose 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex has been ablated. Though he or 
she may make decisions in everyday life, he or she engages in 
the most unsullied dialectic and has the most reliable path to 
true knowledge. 
But, of course, Plato was rhetoric’s critic, not its champion, 
and his denigrations of likelihood as subject matter functioned 
as devaluations of rhetoric itself. Aristotle’s position was quite 
different. According to Aristotelian epistemology, eikos is one of 
our necessary sources of knowledge about the world. For him, 
since something must be either potentially true or false in order 
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to require deliberation, rhetoric does not concern itself with the 
necessarily true (Rhetoric I.2.1357a12-13, trans. Freese). 
Rhetoric, it follows, is the realm of likelihoods and arguments 
from eikos are a legitimate part of discourse. Furthermore, 
Aristotle regarded argument from eikos as legitimate on its own 
terms. One does not refute an argument from likelihood by 
showing that it can be otherwise, but rather must demonstrate 
that it is not likely to be so. In other words, one cannot simply 
hold it to the standard of proof of the true, but must refute eikos 
according to its own conditions. 
Although Aristotle considered eikos necessary when dealing 
with arguments about human action, he believed its legitimate 
use is limited. For example, when a man has no witnesses to 
support his contention, he can resort to eikos and appeal for a 
decision on that basis (Rhetoric, I.15.1376a17, trans. Freese). 
However, when a man has witnesses on his side, he should 
argue that, “Probabilities incur no responsibility, and that there 
would have been no need of evidence, if an investigation 
according to the arguments were sufficient” (Rhetoric, 
I.15.1376a18, trans. Freese). Aristotle thus held that in some 
cases eikos is a valuable form of argument, though its value is 
compromised once more direct forms of evidence, such as sworn 
testimony, are available. Therefore, eikos exists in a tenuous 
position with respect to other forms of knowledge. According to 
Aristotle, eikos also has another major place of application. It is 
indispensable when communicating with the masses. He 
explained that even if scientific knowledge of the true is 
available, the masses often are simply not persuaded by such 
knowledge. Therefore, one must deal with them in terms of that 
which is generally accepted: eikos (Rhetoric, I.1.1355a12, trans. 
Freese). 
Aristotle acknowledged a place in rhetoric not only for eikos, 
but also for emotion. In the Rhetoric, he noted that, “The 
judgments we deliver are not the same when we are influenced 
by joy or sorrow, love or hate” (Rhetoric, I.2.1356a5, trans. 
Freese). Well aware of language’s power to rouse emotion and 
influence judgment, he admitted emotion’s truly vital role in 
rhetoric, devoting a considerable section of the Rhetoric to 
defining the various kinds of emotions and the circumstances 
that produce them, though he criticized those rhetoricians who 
attended exclusively to the use of emotion to effect persuasion 
(Rhetoric, II.1.1378a8-I.11.1388b7, trans. Freese; Rhetoric, 
I.1.1354a5-6, trans. Freese). 
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Putting Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis in 
incongruous contact with Aristotle’s views on eikos engenders 
the following reflections. Both Aristotle and Damasio conceive 
of emotion and likelihood as important means of negotiating 
contingent human affairs. Damasio’s theory of somatic markers 
also suggests a functional connection between the two. In 
outlining a mechanism by which likelihood is embodied, 
Damasio’s theory also suggests an additional way in which 
likelihoods impact our everyday decisions, actions, and 
discourse. Perhaps most compelling is the incredibly broad and 
pervasive role for likelihoods that this suggests. Damasio claims 
that “few if any perceptions of any object or event, actually 
present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in emotional 
terms. Through either innate design or by learning, we react to 
most, perhaps all, objects with emotions, however weak, and 
subsequent feelings, however feeble” (Damasio, 2003, 93). The 
language we encounter, whether directed toward us or simply in 
our purview, is always interacting with our system of somatic 
markers and therefore is always engaged with our embodied 
likelihoods. Therefore, according to Damasio’s theory, the 
likelihoods that make their way into argument are only a small 
fraction of those that actually influence our behavior. 
The collision of perspectives here is jarring, and in some 
ways similar to the movie zoom out, in which that which you 
have been paying close attention to, such as a single street, is 
suddenly placed in increasingly broader contexts, from 
cityscape, to nation, to earth, to space, to the universe. You 
thereby experience a dizzying sensation of how small, really, 
that single street is in the grander scheme of things. The somatic 
marker hypothesis suggests that, embedded in the very neural 
architecture of our bodies, likelihoods influence rhetorical 
affairs in an astonishingly pervasive way. And if their domain is 
so vast, the question of whether to allow explicit verbalizations 
of eikos in argument appears comparatively small. This 
juxtaposition of perspectives provides a unique vantage point 
from which to consider anew the question of legitimacy, about 
which Aristotle was greatly concerned. In one sense, the 
question becomes diminished in its recasting. It is not wrong, 
not incorrect, and nothing has been proven or disproven. But 
the question has been displaced in some way. 
So what, then, of sophists such as Corax and Tisias, Gorgias, 
and Antiphon, who were known for their rampant and 
unapologetic use of arguments from eikos, particularly for 
forensic purposes. For example, in Antiphon’s The Murder of 
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Herodes, a defendant stands accused of murder in a case that 
lacks direct evidence. When a witness says that after committing 
the murder, the defendant enlisted his aid to help conceal the 
crime, the defendant counters with a clever appeal to likelihood, 
stating, “Here I have an ally in probability. I would surely not be 
so foolish as to plan on my own to kill the man, so that no one 
should be my accomplice (for in accomplices lay my whole 
danger), but when the deed was done, then enlist witnesses and 
confidants” (Sprague, 1972, 174). However, since the Sophists 
developed no systematic treatises on the subject and so little of 
their own writings survive, our perspective by incongruity 
occurs at something of a distance, as we cast the somatic marker 
hypothesis alongside the Sophists’ largely reconstructed 
theoretical positions (see, for example, Poulakos, 1983; 
Schiappa, 1991). 
By one concise summary, which reflects the dominant 
account, the Sophist position was “that appearance and opinion 
are the closest that human beings can come to ‘truth’ and 
‘knowledge’ about the world, and that opinion is subject to 
persuasion through speech” (Johnstone, 2006, 282; see Crick, 
2010, 27). The Sophists’ embrace of eikos, then, is tied to their 
positive valuation of appearance and opinion and the sort of 
practical knowledge constituted by them, which is itself 
concomitant with an underlying subjectivism. Appearance and 
opinion exist via mental representation and the person who 
makes the weaker argument the stronger, employing probable 
argument in the process, does so in terms of someone’s 
cognitive apparatus. The somatic marker hypothesis, therefore, 
highlights the cognitivist bent of the Sophists’ embrace of the 
probable. 
In a playful form of incongruity, we can use the somatic 
marker hypothesis to cast the Sophists as conservative, a Gorilla 
mask for Sophists if ever there was one. The Sophists are 
generally regarded as intellectual rebels, upending tradition and 
defying convention with the “desire to dazzle [and] shock” 
(Gagarin, 2001, 289; Gould, 1955, 58). Yet the somatic marker 
casts their version of likelihood as a tidier, more modest, and 
controlled version than other possibilities. Moreover, they can 
be seen as rather staidly upholding the conscious mind as 
fulcrum for likelihood management, together with other forms 
of world-knowing and world-making. Their embrace of 
likelihood, therefore, is not quite as wholescale as it could be, 
and there is a tinge of conservativism to their relativism. 
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Conclusion 
In a neurorhetoric of incongruity, the somatic marker 
hypothesis neither confirms nor disconfirms any particular 
ancient views on eikos. Instead, by positing a pervasive 
embodied system of likelihood management, it both deepens 
and disrupts our understanding of them. Now the difference 
between what I have done and affirming, disconfirming, or the 
like is both subtle and substantial. In taking a non-foundational 
stance that is invested in perspective, is at ease with conjectural 
possibility, and does not demand empirical substantiation, I 
have remained in the realm of the critic artist. And of course, 
importantly, this means that I can bracket the foundationalist 
empirical investments of neuroscience. 
It is possible that Damasio is wrong and there is no system of 
somatic markers mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. And though his theory has been highly influential, it has 
also been the subject of critique (Dunn et al., 2006; Maia and 
McClelland, 2004). But as a rhetorician, I am not trained to 
assess it on empirical grounds. Nor do I want to. As a 
rhetorician, the confirmation of theories is of less interest to me 
than the way in which those theories are useful as forms, 
patterns, and recipes in the abstract (Brummett, 1984, 103). I 
am ok with vampires. In my example of how to use 
neuroscientific research in a non-foundational manner, the 
somatic marker hypothesis is not the final word on argument 
and likelihood, nor does it make obsolete the ancients. Instead it 
offers something more modest: a fresh angle from which to view 
ancient discussions of eikos anew. 
The approach to neurorhetorics I recommend empowers the 
rhetorician by valuing habits of thought that have long 
characterized the field, beginning with a spirited openness to think 
with and against the neuroscientific claim and think through its 
implications for rhetoric. In doing so, it may invigorate old 
conversations and begin new ones, enriching us with novel ways to 
conceive of rhetorical theory and history. In many ways, a non-
foundational neurorhetoric reverses Bowers’ suggestion that 
rhetoric be regarded as pre-scientific. Instead, neuroscience is pre-
rhetorical; it serves us, becoming grist for our rhetorical 
perspectives on the communicative world. 
Copyright © 2018 Michelle Gibbons 
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